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PHILOSOPHIA 
Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak 
Since the modern faith in Reason has died, the way is reopened for a thor-
ough discussion of the relations between philosophy and theology. Being 
metaphilosophical as well as meta theological, such a discussion presuppos-
es solid acquaintance with the concrete praxis of philosophy and theology 
as existentially rooted enterprises developed in the history of particular cul-
tures and individual persons. This article defends the thesis that philoso-
phy in the modern sense of the word never has been and cannot be autarkic 
because it cannot demonstrate the truth of the faith from which it draws its 
basic stance and orientation. If this faith is the faith of a Christian, it is 
impossible to draw a sharp distinction between the philosophical and the 
theological activities of such a philosopher. The stubborn attempt to restrict 
one's thought to autonomous philosophy wounds and paralyzes the think-
ing of Christians and destroys most of its relevance. The old synthetic con-
ception of philosophia, upheld by Plato and the Stoics no less than by the 
Fathers of the Church, deserves a reevaluation. Despite the profound dif-
ferences between unscientific premodernity and modern scientificity, that 
old conception is a more adequate description of the philosophical practice 
performed in real human lives. 
The relations between philosophy and theology are no longer a hotly debat-
ed question among Christians, and yet they are constitutive for the frame-
work in which their thinking develops. Their schools seem to have found a 
modus vivendi for the coexistence of both disciplines, but as far as I know, 
this coexistence is not supported by a generally accepted meta theory and 
fundamental "philosophico-theological" methodology. In this paper, I 
would like to challenge a powerful conception of the ways in which philos-
ophy and theology are and should be related and to propose a different 
conception. I will here focus on these disciplines insofar as they are prac-
ticed by Christians, and, more precisely, by Catholics. The question is fun-
damental and consequently difficult, as are all questions regarding the tran-
scendental conditions of basic practices and theories. A skillful solution 
presupposes not only competence in both philosophy and theology, and 
especially in their methodological and meta-theoretical parts; it also 
demands that Christians who practice these disciplines have a genuine, 
practical as well as emotional, experience of their faith and that they be 
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aware of this experience while reflecting on their faith. It is, thus, neither 
enough to have studied all of Greek or modem philosophy, nor to be a pro-
fessional theologian, unless the latter also participates in the ongoing philos-
ophy. Since I myself have spent more time doing philosophy than theolo-
gy, my approach will show a certain onesidedness. I hope, therefore, that 
professional theologians, from their perspective, will correct my errors and 
lack of sensitivity. Another wish is that philosophers and theologians join 
their skills to discuss the assumptions this article states only in a program-
maticway. 
I. The Question 
The format of a paper does not permit me to begin with an accurate 
description of the situation of philosophical and theological studies in most 
Catholic universities. Neither can I even summarize some of the splendid 
and highly relevant studies on the historical genesis of this situation, from 
Henri De Lubac's Surnaturel (1946) to Michael Buckley's The Origins of 
Modern Atheism (1987) and Louis Dupre's Passage to Modernity (1993). 
Instead of a diagnosis, I will limit myself to a few obvious reminders. Let 
me begin with the trivial observation that, like almost everywhere in acade-
mia, most Catholic universities have separated philosophical and theologi-
cal studies by offering them in different departments. Most departments of 
philosophy do not tolerate theological interference, while many theology 
departments do not care for philosophy. If we had enough time to discuss 
the explicit and implicit beliefs and assumptions underlying this division, it 
would probably stir up critical amazement among the discussants and 
hopefully convince some of them that our question is an urgent one. Let me 
immediately pass instead to a more constructive observation, sketching 
some elements that we should take into account if we, as Christians, want to 
practice philosophy and theology according to their most rigorous 
demands without prejudice against the practice of a genuinely Christian life 
and without giving up our solidarity with the non-Christians of our society 
and world. 
Philosophia 
Since Pythagoras, who perhaps invented the word, philosophia has been 
practiced in many ways. A history of its meanings and modes occupies 
more than 300 dense columns in the excellent Historisches Worterbuch der 
Philosophie (vol. 7, c. 572-911). It reminds us of the fact that the typically mod-
em definition of philosophy as a purely theoretical result of autonomous rea-
son and common experience is only one of the varieties that have developed 
in Western culture. Between philosophy as, for example, Gregory of Nyssa 
saw it exemplified in the holy life of his sister Macrina, and the ideal of a uni-
versal and fundamental science, which has haunted modem thinkers, many 
possibilities of doing philosophy have been tried out. Many distinctions 
should be made when we talk about the definition and the method or the 
history of philosophy. I cannot even start doing this here, but I need to make 
at least one important distinction: the distinction between philosophy as a 
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serious and profound involvement on the way to truth, and philosophy in a 
less committed sense. Doing philosophy can be a game, like chess-playing; it 
can be done as a science, pursued out of curiosity, or performed as a job from 
9 to 5. However, in the following considerations, I will focus on the kind of 
philosophy that is practiced as a profoundly important, even decisive ele-
ment of a human life in search of wisdom. If we may affirm that human life 
as such desires wisdom, and that this desideratum involves insight, philoso-
phy can be seen and practiced as the reflective and methodical stylization of 
the human quest for insight and wisdom. This is philosophy as practiced by 
the great philosophers from Parmenides to Wittgenstein and Heidegger. For 
them, philosophy was a way of life; some of them even praised it as the only 
possibility of leading a happy life. They didn't separate it as a purely theo-
retical discipline from the practical and emotional elements of human exis-
tence, but insisted on their unity. However, it is characteristic of the Greco-
European tradition that it has stressed the role of thinking and theoria in the 
pursuit of happiness. 
As a quest for insight on the way to wisdom, philosophy was more radi-
cal than any science, episteme, or mere theory; it emerged from the most rad-
ical desire (eros, desiderium) of human existence and remained rooted in 
what some have called the "heart." As a search for wisdom, philosophy 
was careful not to cut its conceptuality off from the experiences of humanly 
growing lives. Reason and rationality were celebrated and refined, but nei-
ther isolated nor seen as self-sufficient principles for the discovery of truth. 
Even Hegel demanded that his students bring a faith to his lectures: "faith 
in reason" (Glaube an die Vernunft) was necessary to follow the master in his 
showing how reason - and reason alone - could bring to light the truth and 
meaning of all things.! 
I cannot fully justify here the thesis I am advancing, namely that every 
seriously committed philosophy necessarily involves a basic faith, but I 
hope that my readers already agree with me on this, or at least consider it 
plausible. Nobody can philosophize without some unproven but sponta-
neous or postulated conviction which has the character of trust. A basic 
moment of such a conviction is the trust that reality, human existence, the 
universe and being as such cannot be utterly senseless; they must have (a) 
meaning (or, at least, under certain conditions they will have meaning). 
"Omne esse est intelligible" is one of the expressions for this faith; "ens et 
bonum convertuntur" is another. 
The faith of a philosopher does not stop at this basic trust, however. As 
soon as it expresses itself in a concrete way of life and thought, it takes a 
form in which cultural, historical, and personal moments are recognizable. 
A careful study of any great philosophy can discover pre-rational elements 
that have coalesced into a typical stance and orientation. The rationality of 
modem philosophy was not autarkic enough to shape by its own force 
alone the basic movement and discoveries of a human life. Reason comes 
too late for this, although its critical reflections playa role (but only one) in 
the (re)direction and the (re)adjustment of a philosopher's existence. A 
human life has taken its basic form before it discovers the possibilities of 
what we now, in modem contexts, call "philosophy." 
The faith of a philosopher realizes itself in a basic mode of experiencing, 
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sensing, accepting and approaching life and the world. This mode is 
expressed in a certain mood, a specific way of being attuned (in bitterness, 
resignation, melancholy, enjoyment, gratitude ... ), of welcoming (or exclud-
ing) phenomena, and of participating in the history of human praxis. 
Philosophy as Participation in a History 
Here I must insert another analysis, though again too briefly: an analysis 
of the historical aspect of all philosophical activity. 
If philosophy is an activity which cannot be practiced unless it has been 
learned, participation in philosophical discussions presupposes that I have 
been initiated and have acquired at least some experience in it. When I phi-
losophize, I am already set in my ways, although I can still change partially 
or even undergo some kind of conversion. Other philosophers must have 
introduced me to and trained me in an activity that has been going on 
before I became a student, even before I or we or America were born. I was 
introduced into philosophy not by Logos, Reason, or Empeiria, but by profes-
sors so and so and by the texts they recommended as instructive, worth-
while or exemplary. There is no way to begin autonomously; as a student, I 
cannot avoid accepting the authority of certain teachers and texts and tak-
ing for granted - at least provisionally - that what they do is philosophy. 
Later, I might discover that that was only a particular style within a varied 
field, that there are other good or better teachers who recommend different 
texts and argue in a different vein, and that modern philosophy is only a 
fragment from a history of philosophical activity that stretches over a peri-
od more than six times longer than the period from Hobbes and Descartes 
to our days. By that point, however, it is too late for starting all over again. 
In the meantime, I have been formed in a specific style of philosophizing on 
the basis of particular assumptions that were never proven but have been 
generally accepted for some time. In discovering the relativity of the philo-
sophical position to which I have adjusted, I can start working on a critical 
reform or conversion of that position, but if it is true that reason is not autar-
kic, the new position which I will adopt will again be a particular one, and -
if my thinking has some originality - an individual one. 
II. Christians Who Philosophize 
Faith 
After these metaphilosophical preliminaries, we can direct our attention 
to the distinctive character of thinking as practiced by Christians who are 
also philosophers. Let us suppose that some Christian has been introduced 
into philosophy by getting acquainted with analytic and/ or continental phi-
losophy as they are practiced in most American universities. Most courses 
such a person has taken did not touch on religious questions. Probably the 
impression was given that, in philosophy, everybody could find out the 
same truths on every topic. Even if the program contained some philoso-
phy of religion, it will probably not have included theological explanations 
of Christian faith. Yet a Christian cannot do without theology, for, as a 
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Christian, you are committed to a community of faith with a life and 
thought of its own. You have been initiated and confirmed in the faith, the 
beliefs, the rituals and the ethos of this community, and for most Christians, 
this has happened long before they studied philosophy. Your faith neither 
consists in the affirmation of propositions, and even less in a theory; funda-
mentally, it is trust in God as revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. This trust orients and mobilizes your entire existence; it per-
meates all your possibilities and provides your participation in human his-
tory with its ultimate meaning. Your faith has a memory and expects an 
eschaton; this makes you feel grateful for God's work of creation and 
redemption, and it confirms your hope. It inspires you with love and com-
passion, nahlral responses to God's spirit of grace. Faith is neither a doxa 
about God, nor a superscience; it is neither Kant's Fiirwahrhalten, nor Hume's 
belief. It does not compete with any philosophy, if philosophy is no more 
than theory. Pis tis, fides, is the most radical and total confidence that sup-
ports all behavior, feeling and thought of a Christian. It constitutes the basic 
stance and dynamism of a Christian life and decides about its final mean-
ing. It thus determines the meaning of all behavior and thinking in which 
Christians express their concerns. This does not mean that we can deduce 
from faith what the full content and method of behavior, ethos, politics, art, 
science, and philosophy in our time should be, but it does involve an orien-
tation, a certain style, a certain "music." 
Culture 
Besides being members of a religious community, Christians are children 
of a particular epoch and culture. As such, we spontaneously share many 
tastes, conceptions and uses with non-Christians. Some of the prevailing 
assumptions might be unChristian or anti-Christian; church authorities or 
saints might warn us that we should not share these assumptions, but some 
of the existing practices and institutions are so powerful that we cannot 
avoid participating in them. The capitalistic organization of the world econ-
omy is an example. Church leaders may condemn this system, but if we 
want to survive, we cannot stop sharing its functioning. We seem to be in a 
bind, as st. Paul was in a bind when he sent Philemon's slave back to his 
master. Another example is the modern institutionalization of massive vio-
lence and the fierce nationalism which again and again proves stronger 
than solidarity with fellow humans and fellow Christians. 
These examples might convince us that Christians not only participate in 
the noble and beautiful aspects of civilization, but just as much in the "sins 
of the world." A similar remark can be made vis-a-vis the theoretical ele-
ments of the culture. It is not always clear to what extent the beliefs of an 
epoch spontaneously assimilated by Christians are compatible with their 
faith or form a stumbling block for their endeavor to understand who and 
how they are. 
The Philosophy of Christians 
Christians who practice philosophy are committed to an historical 
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process in which universities, journals, books, libraries, conferences, courses 
and standard schedules play key roles. Educated in selected styles and 
schools with a profound reverence for particular authorities and traditions, 
we participate in discussions on privileged topics according to certain fash-
ions; we prefer certain authors and texts and neglect or despise others, but 
we continue to talk about "philosophy" and "the history of philosophy" as 
if we knew them in their entirety. In any case, we exercise this activity by 
participating in "what is going on in philosophy." Even if we are very orig-
inal, we continue a history that has been developing for 2,600 years, becom-
ing ourselves links in a complicated network of chains. 
As philosophers, we began by sharing unproven beliefs and explicit or 
hidden assumptions; much of the time thereafter was spent in trying to find 
out to what extent those assumptions are justifiable, but we have not yet 
arrived at a complete proof for all of them. The awareness about this leads 
us to the well-known problem of the ''beginning,'' the "arche," the principia, 
and the "ground" of philosophy. The main current of modem philosophy 
(from Hobbes and Descartes to Hegel) has been dominated by the belief 
that, through common experience and universal reason, it is possible to 
establish an unshakable foundation on which the system of truth can be 
built. This project has failed and led to a situation of relativism and skepti-
cism on the one side, whereas, on the other side, there is a growing convic-
tion that the empirical and rational moments of philosophy are rooted in 
deeper levels of existence with a stringency of their own. Some have point-
ed towards a "logic of the heart," others to our prepredicative familiarity 
with things as a form of understanding inherent to the practice of human 
life itself. Above I have identified every philosopher's basic faith as the soil 
and source of his thinking. Spinoza's or Kant's philosophies, no less than 
medieval or Greek philosophies, were rooted in and inspired by pre-philo-
sophical commitments. Without any faith, no philosopher is genuine, if 
philosophy is more serious than a scientific specialty at juggling hypotheses 
according to formal skills. 
Theology 
Christians are established on a rock: Jesus Christ. The expression of their 
faith is heavily dependent on the culhlral history in which they participate, 
however. It is thus a combination of that faith and the transitory elements 
of a specific culture. 
In a civilization where philosophical reflection plays an important role, 
the concrete forms in which Christian faith is formulated contain philosoph-
ical elements. The ensemble of its expressions, insofar as they reflect this 
faith in the language of concephlality, constitutes Christian theology. 
A Christian who has become a philosopher shares a world of arguments 
with other philosophers, Christian as well as non-Christian. As a philoso-
pher, one must be at home in the ongoing ways of argumentation, be an 
expert in the skills that are required or in vogue, have experiences similar to 
those of others, and look at things from comparable perspectives. At the 
same time, a Christian is at home in a community of faith which does not 
belong to any specific period of time, culture, language, race or country. 
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This community is not an abstraction, however; on the contrary, it is the 
most fundamental and encompassing, and thus the most concrete, commu-
nity of all. Grace, faith, hope and gratitude pervade the entire life of 
Christians from top to bottom and vice-versa, uniting them in one 
communio, even if their authenticity and innocence is hampered or damaged 
by the difficulties of human life. 
Our question can now be reformulated in the following terms: How can 
Christians, in their lives and thoughts, combine membership in an historical 
community of faith and salvation (which at the same time transcends all 
epochs and is culturally concrete) with a real participation in the republic of 
philosophy, where they practice solidarity with colleagues who are sup-
ported by other faiths? 
If philosophy were no more than mastery in skills and tools, there would 
be no problem. Purely formal elements of philosophy (if these exist) can be 
shared by everybody, like those of mathematics or chemistry. Their univer-
sality is paid for by a very reduced relevance with regard to the decisive 
questions of human existence. A serious or involved philosopher is 
engaged in orientations and wagers that cannot be justified by formal tech-
niques alone. Once involved, one is already on a specific way - guided by a 
basic trust that it will lead to more truth. 
Why is it that many Christians who are involved in philosophy try to 
maintain a strict separation between their philosophical work and their 
reflection on the Christian meaning of the lives they live in their Christian 
community? Do they want to convince their non-Christian colleagues that 
their method and findings are as authentically philosophical (rational, 
empirically justified, universally valid, etc.) as those of agnostic, atheist, or 
skeptical thinkers? Is there anything in the philosophy they share with the 
latter that makes a wholehearted adherence to the Christian community dif-
ficult? Do they suffer from a conflict between two loyalties? This would be 
the case if the content, the orientation, the approach, or the spirit of the 
philosophical practice in which they engage were hostile to the spirit of 
Christianity. But how would such be possible since both faith and philoso-
phy are committed to the quest for truth? 
To acquire some clarity in these questions, a Christian cannot rely on phi-
losophyalone. As philosophers, we must, of course, research the sources to 
which we owe our perspectives and convictions, including the philosophi-
cal faith which is expressed in our particular and individual modes of philo-
sophical and Christian involvement. But what and how we are insofar as 
we are Christians is not revealed by reflection alone; faith itself gives a more 
adequate interpretation of this fact; and faith is a gift of the Spirit, a grace. 
Christians cannot ignore the way in which their own faith illuminates their 
experiences of world and history; neither can they simply neglect the 
reflecting self-interpretation of the religious community to which they 
belong. This statement does not entail that a Christian should deny the dif-
ference between faith itself and its epochal expressions in typically Greco-
European forms of reflexivity; it does mean, however, that we, as philoso-
phizing Christians, cannot refrain from engaging in theological reflection on 
the relevance of Christian faith for our commitment to philosophy. The 
question of the relations between philosophy and faith involves thus two 
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series of questions: 
a) questions concerning the relations between the faiths that underlie 
actually existing forms of philosophy on the one hand and 
Christian faith on the other; 
b) questions about the relations between the typically philosophical 
mode of explanation and the theological approach. 
Our question appears to involve us in a theological question, at least to some 
extent. 
In fact, every Christian who is not utterly naive has been initiated in 
some form of theology. Catechisms, for example, are full of popularized 
theology. They also contain philosophical elements, however, which most 
often pertain to a recent or less recent past. Thus, when I was six years old, I 
learned that the ultimate meaning of human life lies in union with God, 
while at the same time, I was initiated into a Platonizing theory about the 
separability of our eternal soul and a mortal body. 
The" Spirit" of a Philosophy 
If philosophy were only a technique, having its own fixed and subordi-
nate place and function within the economy of human life, there would not 
be any reason to notice the differences between Christian and other philoso-
phers. If, however, "philosophy" is the name of a way of life, a profoundly 
committed involvement in an historical quest for wisdom, it cannot be sepa-
rated from the personal and communal faith to which it owes its motiva-
tion. A Christian who enters the realm of philosophy by getting acquainted 
with Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger 
and so on is confronted with worlds of thought that express particular 
modes of faith. If we take "experience" in its widest sense, as the global and 
pre-theoretical way in which the unfolding of a human life in space and 
time is experienced, we can here also use the word "experience" to point at 
the personal history of events and experiments from which philosophical 
thought emerges. The experience of a life shows a certain spirit: the spirit in 
which it is accepted and risked, oriented and "projected," undergone and 
heeded. Every philosophy, for example Spinoza's Ethics, can be interpreted 
as the conceptual translation of an underlying experience. This makes it 
possible to ask what kind of spirit is evident in such a translation and to 
what extent it expresses the experience of the individual or collective life in 
which it is rooted. The answer to these questions cannot be found outside a 
careful reconstruction of singular oeuvres in their own contexts,> and the 
results depend on the varieties of faith, experience, and reconstructive skills 
of the interpreters. There will thus be ample occasion for debates. 
To further our inquiry, we must investigate whether Christian faith pro-
vides us with the means that permit us to diagnose the neutral, Christian, 
un-Christian, or anti-Christian character of the various theories that form 
the actual scene of contemporary and former philosophy. This question 
must be answered if we want to know whether concrete solidarity with all 
kinds of non-Christian philosophers is compatible with membership in the 
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Christian community. The situation from which this question arises is in 
many respects similar to the situation in which the intellectuals of early 
Christianity found themselves. They too were confronted with a variety of 
non-Christian philosophers stemming from other spirits than that of Jesus 
Christ. 
Integration 
When Origen, for example, studied in Alexandria, or when Basil and the 
two Gregories studied in Athens, or when Saint Augustine was reading the 
Platonists, they saw themselves tempted and challenged by philosophies 
whose character they admired, although they recognized their pagan char-
acter. Something had to be changed in those philosophies in order to inte-
grate them into their own thought and that of their Christian communities. 
Such changes could not be superficial because paganism, and, more con-
cretely, Hellenistic philosophy, was a way of life, committed to specific 
practices and assumptions fed by a specific faith. The philosophies of the 
pagans could not be cut off from the experience in which they were at 
home. Integration into a radically different Christian frame demanded 
more originality than assimilation or competition according to accepted 
rules and uses; it demanded a radical transformation. Another spirit had to 
take possession of the elements gathered by the non-Christian inspiration in 
the works that were offered as the highlights of civilization. Instead of 
rejecting the pagan philosophers wholesale, the early thinkers of early 
Christianity demonstrated the originality of their spirit by changing parts of 
those philosophies into seeds (logoi spermatikoi) and elements (stoicheia) of 
new ensembles showing a radically different inspiration. Not assimilation, 
but the combination of critical confrontation and inspired transformation 
generated a new philosoplzia, whose Christian character could not be denied. 
The refusal to betray the source of their Christian existence made them cre-
ative in the constructive destruction of non-Christian philosophies. Insofar 
as the thinkers of Christianity were successful, their appropriation of pagan 
thoughts makes it impossible to separate in their work some parts that 
would be called "philosophical" in the modern sense of the word from 
other, theological and typically Christian parts. The Christianization of 
thinking is neither a marginal business, nor a "super-added" level on top of 
an autarkic human nature. Grace transforms all the elements of life and 
thought. And this statement is not an abstract and speculative thesis with-
out empirical basis; the Christian experience of life as a whole and in detail 
is radically different from an unredeemed existence. I do not want to 
exclude th~t certain works of the Fathers or the medieval Magistri contain 
unassimilated or badly integrated, and in this sense pagan elements, but the 
task was and is clear and sound. Christians cannot leave the secular ele-
ments of the actual culhlre untouched by their faith; neither can they refrain 
from participating in that culture by withdrawing into a ghetto. If their 
faith is alive, it inevitably transforms the elements of the existing culhlre, 
including its philosophy, into a body of its own. The assumption of culture 
is an ongoing Incarnation, and the Christianization of philosophy is an 
important part of it. 
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Modern Philosophy 
Students of our time are confronted with problems similar to those of the 
early Fathers of the Church. What is the spirit of modern and postmodern 
philosophy? Did their great figures express a Christian inspiration in phi-
losophy? In discussing the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, I 
for my part would defend the thesis that their philosophies, including their 
appeal to Christian faith, in fact have not been faithful to it, but it would be 
more effective to show that the basic faith on which the whole enterprise of 
modern philosophy rests is not compatible with the faith of a Christian. 
To be brief, I propose to characterize the source or principle of modern 
philosophy - i.e., the philosophy that still dominates our institutions and 
manners - as a faith that combines the following convictions: 
1. Reason, as interpreted in the modern logic and methodology of 
rationality, is the supreme and sovereign judge of reflective speech 
or writing. 
2. Reason needs experience. 
3. The experience that counts in the search for truth is a kind of expe-
rience that is or can be had by all people who have the normal use 
of the human senses, especially the eyes. Paradigmatic for this 
kind of experience are indubitable sensations and scientific obser-
vation. 
One basic element of the concrete quest for truth is emphatically silenced 
in these principles: the element I have called faith, or trust. Modern philoso-
phy ignores the decisive role of its own faith in reason, in science, and in 
certain criteria for evidence and trustworthy experience. It also denies the 
relevance of good taste, virtue, religion, prayer, and dialogue for thinking 
and discovering the truth. Very different from the medieval and patristic 
doctores, but also from Plato and other Greek lovers of sophia, modern phi-
losophy does not have any interest in the religious, moral, and aesthetic 
spirituality from which a well- or badly-oriented, an enthusiastic, moody, 
lazy, overheated, deathly boring or hopeful thinking emerges. As is evident 
for everybody who is concerned about emotional economy, such a neglect 
has dramatic consequences for the course of a human life. If the practice of 
philosophy is a way of life, it cannot ignore the sources from which it in fact 
draws its energy, its desires and hopes and interests, its perseverance in the 
search and so on. Philosophical "research" - the word is revealing - has cut 
itself off from spirituality and faith, thus repressing what makes it so enjoy-
able, and might make it an integral part of happiness. Deathly boredom 
and disgust (acedia) is the inevitable result. 
Experience 
That philosophy cannot be autarkic is already clear from its dependence 
on experience, but it has tried to narrow the domain of experience to such a 
small and almost rational (i.e., logically conquerable) part of its material that 
it still could cherish its illusions of rational mastery. Fortunately, the phe-
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nomenological movement has shown us, for more than a hundred years, 
that human experience encompasses a much wider field of trustworthy and 
interesting experiences, but some schools continue to believe that we should 
restrict ourselves to indubitable impressions. They prefer not to consider 
the conditions of those more interesting experiences without which it is 
impossible to talk about genuine beauty, moral virtues, authenticity, love, 
phenomenality, being, etc. Their "democratic" ideal (often confused with 
universal validity) condemns them to neglecting or repressing all differ-
ences in receptivity, taste, openmindedness, refinement and civilization; the 
result is the utter triviality of the matter on which they discourse. 
The phenomenological revaluation of the entire range of authentic experi-
ences reconnects us with a 3,000-year-old tradition which was disrupted by 
the methodical restrictions of the modern sciences. These made such an 
impression on the leading philosophers that they left all questions of existen-
tial wisdom to the experience of less scholarly persons. The historical split 
between philosophers who tried to be as scientific as the geometers and 
physicists of their time, and those who continued to search for wisdom out-
side the world of philosophy, has caused a long tragedy: for 400 years wis-
dom withdrew from thought because thinking withdrew from spirituality. 
Autonomy of reason? 
The attempt at rational autonomy has been a disaster for our culture. Its 
failure is now almost everywhere recognized: we are not able to prove any-
thing substantial without fundamental assumptions and experiences that 
we accept as plausible or credible, although they cannot be fully justified. 
We are supported by a host of beliefs, but we do not yet agree on the "logic" 
of these beliefs. The domain where "autonomous" reason has celebrated 
some triumphs is the domain of purely formal disciplines, especially mod-
ern logic. Since all of these disciplines presuppose but do not prove any-
thing about the reality and the meaning of our existence in the world, they 
are abstract and hypothetical. As soon as we talk about some content, end-
less doubts about every possible description or analysis come up, doubts 
which can only be overcome by sticking to some belief. This situation easily 
leads to skepticism or agnosticism, and philosophy is tempted to see itself 
as a game or a particularly desperate way of "living dangerously." 
Skepticism is a child of rationalism, however. It stems from expectations 
that were too high and therefore must be disappointed. 
The discovery that the dream of autonomous Reason cannot be realized 
can also be the initiation to a further discovery: we should neither despair of 
reason and rationality, nor flee into the subjectivism of arbitrary preferences 
and beliefs; instead, we should find out where and how exactly reason's 
marvelous possibilities fit into the economy of human life. This discovery 
presupposes the recognition that philosophy, in the modern sense of the 
word, is not a sovereignly independent tribunal, but an element amidst 
other elements needed for the discovery of important truth. Philosophizing 
is only one, and not the supreme, activity among the activities and possibili-
ties through which humans can approach meaning and insight. For 
Christians, participation in the tradition of modern and postrnodern philos-
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ophy with her own authorities and canonical texts is only possible in the 
following ways: 
a) either we share with non-Christians the discussions of an ongoing 
history in which the participants methodically ignore all references 
to Christian faith and to any other kind of faith (from the preceding 
consideration, it is clear that I see this as an abstract, hypothetical, 
and provisional way of thinking); or 
b) we participate in the ongoing discussions, using at each occasion 
the appropriate rational and empirical skills, but without refraining 
from reflection on the meaning and the structure of our commit-
ment to the Christian faith. 
Philosophia 
I would like to conclude this paper with a summary sketch of the 
Christian philosophia that, by a creative retrieval of the premodern tradition, 
should find its place among the respectable and respected ways of doing 
philosophy. To prevent misunderstandings, I want to state clearly that I am 
pleading neither for any form of neo-ism, nor for other kinds of conserva-
tive or reactionary return to epochs of the past. Repetition and archaeologi-
cal nostalgia are signs of death; historical reconstructions, necessary and 
illuminating as they are, cannot solve by themselves the question of how we 
can achieve tasks similar to, but not identical with, those of Origenes, 
Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, and Nicolas of Cusa. 
In order to be radically reflective, the philosophy of Christians must 
develop as an integral part of a discipline that integrates theology and phi-
losophy into one whole: a "philo-theo-Iogy" that has agreed to be chal-
lenged by non-Christian philosophers. Such a challenge obliges advocates 
of this unified theory to be as competent in philosophy as those non-
Christians who are committed to a godless, agnostic, relativistic, skeptical, 
or dogmatically anti-Christian faith. In philosophizing, Christians will nec-
essarily be aware of the unbreakable connections that weave the philosophi-
cal elements of their reflection into the web of their theological universe, 
while theologians will carefully scrutinize the philosophical elements of 
their own opinions, interpretations and theories. Since the evolution of the 
modern sciences confronts us with an overwhelming mass of texts and 
information, nobody is able to imitate the encyclopedic knowledge of 
geniuses like Origenes, Thomas, or Cusanus; as mastery in both philosophy 
and theology demands at least a double doctorate, it is inevitable that most 
scholars will focus on partial approaches to certain topics. However, it is 
necessary that the partiality of our investigations be practiced as an integral 
moment of the collective contemplation to which the Christian community 
is devoted. In talking of a "collective" contemplation, I do not want to sug-
gest that we should prepare one overall system in which all individual 
attempts at understanding Christian faith would nicely fit as parts of one 
whole. The collectivity of thinking has other structures and rules than the 
systematic coherence of a dogmatic monologue. As a community of faith, 
the koinonia of Christian life permits and demands a plurality of intellectual 
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unfoldings which cannot be levelled to the unity of one theory or methodol-
ogy. But here we touch upon the problem of a non-relativistic pluralism 
which demands a separate analysis. 
Solidarity with other Christians within one historical community cannot 
be separated from solidarity with all non-Christians, even if their thought is 
oriented by another faith. On this worldwide level, the communication can 
remain philosophical, but philosophy itself will have to be more explicit 
than before about the radical differences between the positions from which 
individuals and particular communities receive, perceive, experience, 
observe, understand, and methodically approach the historical world of 
human existence. Christians should no longer be nervous or ashamed 
about their theocentric, christocentric and pneumatic inspiration. Their 
intellectual activity should not feign to be separated from its theological, 
christological and pneumatological setting; on the contrary, the conversa-
tion with individuals and communities that draw their inspiration from 
other commitments demands that they manifest the breadth of mind and 
the radicality of questioning to which the best of their Christian and philo-
sophical traditions have enabled them. If grace is the source and purpose of 
creation, it can only fortify and illuminate our possibilities of understand-
ing. Perhaps philosophia will even lead us again to some sort of theosis 
through contemplation. 
Loyola University Chicago 
NOTES 
1. Cf. the following emphasized passage of the discourse with which 
Hegel began lecturing at the Universtiy of Heidelberg on October 28, 1816: "To 
begin with, I may not appeal to anything else than that, first of all, you come only with 
trust in science and trust in yourselves. The courage to truth, faith in the power of spir-
it, is the first condition of philosophy" (Gesammelte Werke, Hamburg: Meiner, vol. 
18, p. 6). Almost the same sentences are pronounced in Hegel's inaugurallec-
ture at the University of Berlin on October 22, 1818: ''To begin with, I may not 
appeal to anything else than that you come with trust in science, faith in reason, 
trust and faith in yourselves. The courage to truth, faith in the power of spirit, is the 
first condition of philosophical study" (p. 18). 
2. Cf. Adriaan T. Peperzak, System and History in Philosophy. Albany: 
SUNY, 1986, pp. 47-60. 
